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Middle temporal gyrusAutism Spectrum Disorders (ASDs) are characterized by core deﬁcits in social functions. Two theories have been
suggested to explain these deﬁcits: mind-blindness theory posits impaired mentalizing processes (i.e. decreased
ability for establishing a representation of others' state ofmind), while socialmotivation theory proposes that di-
minished reward value for social information leads to reduced social attention, social interactions, and social
learning.Mentalizing andmotivation are integral to typical social interactions, andneuroimaging evidence points
to independent brain networks that support these processes in healthy individuals. However, the simultaneous
function of these networks has not been explored in individuals with ASDs. We used a social, interactive fMRI
task, the Domino game, to explore mentalizing- and motivation-related brain activation during a well-deﬁned
interval where participants respond to rewards or punishments (i.e. motivation) and concurrently process
information about their opponent's potential next actions (i.e. mentalizing). Thirteen individuals with high-
functioning ASDs, ages 12–24, and 14 healthy controls played fMRI Domino games against a computer-
opponent and separately, what they were led to believe was a human-opponent. Results showed that while
individuals with ASDs understood the game rules and played similarly to controls, they showed diminished
neural activity during the human-opponent runs only (i.e. in a social context) in bilateral middle temporal
gyrus (MTG) during mentalizing and right Nucleus Accumbens (NAcc) during reward-related motivation
(Pcluster b 0.05 FWE). Importantly, deﬁcits were not observed in these areas when playing against a
computer-opponent or in areas related to motor and visual processes. These results demonstrate that while
MTG and NAcc, which are critical structures in the mentalizing and motivation networks, respectively, activate
normally in a non-social context, they fail to respond in an otherwise identical social context in ASD compared
to controls. We discuss implications to both the mind-blindness and social motivation theories of ASD and the
importance of social context in research and treatment protocols.
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. Open access under CC BY license. 1. Introduction
Autism spectrum disorders (ASDs), including autism, Asperger's
syndrome and Pervasive Development Disorder—Not Otherwise Speci-
ﬁed (PDD-NOS), are neurodevelopmental conditions characterized by
core deﬁcits in social communication skills evident before the age of 3.arch Center, Institute of Living,
45 7792.
).
.Open access under CC BY license. Interpersonal relationships typically involve effective assessment of
one's own state of mind, as well as that of others. The former includes
motivational processes that appraise the value to the self of rewards
or punishments, real or prospective, as potential consequences of
speciﬁc social situations. The latter includes mentalizing processes
that establish a representation of others' thoughts, desires, goals and
beliefs, also known as ‘Theory of Mind (ToM).’ While motivation and
mentalizing processes are both engaged simultaneously in real-life so-
cial interactions, they are believed to engage selective brain networks
(e.g. Adolphs, 2003; Assaf et al., 2009; Chevallier et al., 2012; Dolan,
2002; Frith and Frith, 2003; Phan et al., 2002; Ressler, 2004). Important-
ly, it has been suggested that abnormal function of thementalizing and/
or themotivation networks in individualswithASDmight underlie their
322 M. Assaf et al. / NeuroImage: Clinical 3 (2013) 321–331symptoms (e.g. Baron-Cohen, 1995; Chevallier et al., 2012; Dawson et al.,
1998, 2005; Frith, 2001; Hill and Frith, 2003; Schultz, 2005). However, to
date there is limited and contradictory evidence regarding the speciﬁc
neural correlates of these networks in individuals with ASDs, and no
study has evaluated their concurrent function in this population during
actual social interaction.
The specialized mentalizing-related network likely involves the
temporoparietal junction (TPJ), superior temporal sulcus (STS), tempo-
ral pole (TP) and medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) in typically devel-
oped individuals (for review see, Frith and Frith, 2003). Although this
network has been mostly studied using explicit ‘off-line’ mentalizing
tasks (i.e., taskswhere participants are explicitly instructed to retrospec-
tively explain the state of mind of other people), implicit ‘on-line’
mentalizing tasks (i.e., tasks where participants are not instructed to
be involved in thinking about the other during an on-going interaction,
thusmentalizing happens in real-time and potentially affects the behav-
ior of the participant him/herself), which emulate real life mentalizing
processes better, have shown that the same network is involved in
both (Assaf et al., 2009; Gallagher et al., 2002; McCabe et al., 2001;
Rilling et al., 2004; Vanderwal et al., 2008). The reward-related motiva-
tion network includes a cortical–basal ganglia circuit, with the nucleus
accumbens (NAcc), orbitofronal cortex (OFC) andmidbrain dopaminer-
gic neurons comprising key regions (for review see Haber and Knutson,
2010). This network is involved in the anticipation and response to both
primary and secondary rewards (e.g., food or money, respectively). We
have previously shown that the NAcc, as well as other reward-related
regions, are also responsive to gains during social competitive interac-
tion, independently of implicit ‘on-line’mentalizing processes (Admon
et al., 2013; Assaf et al., 2009).
There is ample evidence to suggest that mentalizing development
and reasoning is impaired in individuals with ASDs (e.g. Baron-Cohen,
1995; Frith, 2001; Hill and Frith, 2003). Indeed, the ‘mind-blindness’
theory, whichproposes thatmentalizingdeﬁcits are the core underlying
cause of ASDs (Baron-Cohen, 1995), is one of the leading theories of au-
tism. A few small studies to date have explored brain abnormalities re-
lated to explicit ‘off-line’mentalizing in ASD and results are conﬂicting,
with some showing overactivation and others showing underactivation
in individuals with ASDs (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999; Castelli et al., 2002;
Happe et al., 1996;Mason et al., 2008; Piggot et al., 2004). To our knowl-
edge, no study to date has explored the potential neural abnormalities
of this network during the performance of an implicit ‘on-line’
mentalizing task in ASDs. Studying social function and related neural
abnormalities in ASDs with more naturalistic paradigms is of great im-
portance, as there is a discrepancy between performance of individuals
with ASDs on explicit social tasks versus performance in more natural-
istic implicit social conditions (Klin et al., 2003; Volkmar et al., 2004).
A more recent explanation of ASD symptoms, the social motivation
hypothesis, suggests that innately diminished reward valence of social
stimuli, such as faces, leads to reduced attention to these stimuli,
resulting in both abnormal reward processing and deﬁcits in the social
interactions and learning seen in ASD individuals (Chevallier et al.,
2012; Dawson et al., 1998, 2005; Schultz, 2005). Notably, compared to
mentalizing processes, fewer behavioral and neuroimaging studies
have been conducted to support the motivation hypothesis and high-
light the potential neural deﬁcits associated with reward-related moti-
vational processes in ASD, and results are conﬂicting regarding the
deﬁcit's speciﬁcity to social vs. non-social rewards. Several fMRI studies
have explored the reward network in ASDwith somewhat contradicto-
ry results. Schmitz et al. (2008) and Dichter et al. (2012a) showed
hyperactivation of the ACC (Dichter et al., 2012a; Schmitz et al., 2008)
and left middle frontal gyrus (Dichter et al., 2012a) in individuals with
ASDs in response to monetary but not social reward. Scott-Van Zeeland
et al. (2010) and Dichter et al. (2012b) found hypoactivation in frontal
and striatal regions in response to monetary (Dichter et al., 2012b)
and social (Scott-Van Zeeland et al., 2010) rewards. During monetary
but not social reward anticipation, individuals with ASD showedhypoactivation of NAcc and hyperactivation in right hippocampus
(Dichter et al., 2012a). Kohls et al. (2013) found hypoactivation of the
ACC and amygdala in response to social and monetary rewards, but
only monetary rewards resulted in NAcc hypoactivation. A recent
event-related potential (ERP) study (Kohls et al., 2011) demonstrated
reduced P3 activity in children with ASD for anticipation of both social
and monetary reward cues, but no differences for “consumption” of
the rewards. As with neuroimaging studies of mentalizing, to our
knowledge no study has explored the reward-motivational network ac-
tivation during actual social interaction in ASDs.Moreover, no study has
explored these two networks' neural function while they are simulta-
neously engaged in social interaction in ASD subjects.
In the current fMRI study we used an interpersonal competitive
game, the Domino task (Admon et al., 2013; Assaf et al., 2009; Hyatt
et al., 2012; Kahn et al., 2002), to explore the neural correlates of simul-
taneous implicit ‘on-line’ mentalizing and reward-related motivation
processes in high-functioning ASD subjects compared to matched typi-
cally developing controls (TD). Our prior work with the Domino task
showed that the implicit ‘on-line’ mentalizing network included the
TPJ, STS,MPFC, TP and fusiform gyrus, while the reward-relatedmotiva-
tion network subsumed the NAcc, OFC, MFG, SPL, precuneus and cere-
bellum (Assaf et al., 2009). We hypothesized that compared to TD,
individuals with ASD would fail to show increased brain activation in
key areas of both mentalizing and motivation networks, when playing
the game in social versus non-social contexts, i.e., against a human
versus a computer opponent. We further hypothesized that these
abnormalities would be speciﬁc to these relatively high-level social-
cognitive processes, and not be evident in lower-level sensory/motor
cortices, during social interaction.2. Methods
2.1. Subjects
Thirteen individuals with high-functioning (FSIQ N 70) ASDs (ages
12–24, 10 males) were recruited from the Institute of Living outpatient
Child and Adolescent Psychiatry and Community clinics, advertise-
ments in patient and family support groups in the Hartford, CT area,
and by word of mouth. The diagnosis of ASDs were conﬁrmed with
an observational tool, the Autism Diagnostic Observational Schedule
(ADOS, Lord et al., 2000) and by a parental interview, the Autism Diag-
nostic Interview-Revised (ADI-R, Lord et al., 1994), completedunder the
supervision of a research-reliable individual (M.A.). Fourteen TD con-
trols (ages 11–23, 11 males) were also recruited to the study by adver-
tisements in area schools and theOlin centerwebsite, aswell as byword
of mouth. ASD was ruled out in TDs using the ADOS (available for 13 of
the 14 controls), the Social Communication Questionnaire (SCQ, Rutter
et al., 2003) lifetime form (available for 9 controls, including the individ-
ual without ADOS), and a detailed health questionnaire. ADOS total
scores ranged from 0 to 5 (mean = 1.3 ± 1.7) and SCQ scores ranged
from 0 to 3 in this group, well within the normal range. Full scale IQ
was assessed with the Vocabulary and Block Design subsets of the
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-III (WAIS-III) orWechsler Intelligence
Scale for Children-III (WISC-III) andwas available for 12individualswith
ASDs and 13 TD. Table 1 summarizes the participants' demographic in-
formation. Participants were excluded if they had FSIQ b 70, any MRI
contraindication (e.g. in-body metal), present or past neurological
disease (including epilepsy), psychiatric illness (in TD group only) or a
history of head injury with loss of consciousness for N10 min. Eight of
the 13 individuals with ASDs were medicated when scanned (informa-
tion was missing for one patient): ﬁve received CNS stimulants, three
atypical antipsychotic drugs and four SSRI/SNRIs (note that six of the
medicated participants were treated withmore than one drug). All par-
ticipants provided written informed consent/minor assent (parents of
minor participants signed a consent as well), approved by the Hartford
Table 1
Demographic, symptoms assessment and behavioral information. (Mean scores ± standard
deviation).
ASD
(n = 13)
TD
(n = 14)
Group
statistics
p
Age (years)
(range)
17.5 ± 3.3
(12–24)
17.4 ± 3.6
(11–23)
t(25) = 0.1 n.s.
Gender (M/F) 10/3 11/3 χ2(1) = 0.01 n.s.
Handedness (R/L) 11/2 13/1 χ2(1) = 0.4 n.s.
Race (W/B/O) 12/0/1 14/0/0 χ2(3) = 1.1 n.s.
FSIQ (n = 12/13)
(range)
110.9 ± 21.2
(71–135)
122.3 ± 12.8
(100–144)
t(23) = −1.6 n.s.
ADOS-Total (n = 13/13) 13.7 ± 3.9 1.3 ± 1.7 t(24) = 10.4 b0.0001
ADOS-Communication
(n = 14/13)
4.5 ± 1.3 0.9 ± 1.4 t(24) = 6.8 b0.0001
ADOS-Social (n = 14/13) 9.2 ± 3.3 0.4 ± 0.9 t(24) = 9.1 b0.0001
Games Played: Human
Opponent
4.8 ± 0.7 5.1 ± 0.9 F(1) = 1.08 n.s.
Computer Opponent 5.3 ± 1.2 5.2 ± 0.8
Duration of Games
(minutes): Human
3.6 ± 0.4 3.5 ± 0.5 F(1) = 1.89 n.s.
Computer 3.4 ± 0.1 3.4 ± 0.4
Games Won: Human 0.9 ± 0.9 1.2 ± 1.2 F(1) = 0.05 n.s.
Computer 1.6 ± 0.9 1.2 ± 0.8
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study and were compensated for their time.
2.2. The Domino Game Task
The Domino task is a two-player competitive computerized game
modiﬁed from Kahn et al. (2002) and described in detail previously
(Assaf et al., 2009). The scanned participant is the player while a com-
puter randomly generates the opponent's responses. However, to test
the uniqueness of human-related mentalizing, players are told that
they are either playing against a human (the experimenter conducting
the scan) or a computer opponent (two runs of each type). Thus, from
the participants' perspective, during the human-opponent runs they
are playing in an interpersonal competitive context. The game contains
a pool of twenty-eight domino-like chips; at the beginning of each
game, twelve random domino chips are assigned to the player (shown
face up on the screen), four undisclosed chips are assigned to a bank
and one randomly chosen opponent's domino chip (constant through-
out the game) is shown face-up on the board. The 11 remaining chips
from the overall pool are not used in that speciﬁc game. Each assigned
chip can either match the opponent's chip (have one of the opponent
chip's numbers) or not. The player's goal is to dispose of all assigned
chips before the game ends (4 min) to receive a monetary bonus
($5/game).
During each round of the game, the player ﬁrst mentally decides
which chip to play next, following the command ‘Choose’; then moves
the cursor to it following the command ‘Ready’; next places it face
down adjacent to the opponent's chip, following the command ‘Go’;
and ﬁnally awaits the opponent's response (either 3.4, 5.4 or 7.4 s
later) of either ‘Show’ or ‘No-Show’ (see Fig. 1). The ‘Show’ command
exposes the player's selected chip, while ‘No-Show’ leaves it unexposed.
Following a 5.4 ± 2 second pause after the opponent's response
(Response to Outcome interval; see below), the next round begins
with the presentation of the ‘Choose’ command.
Based on the player's choice and opponent's response there are four
possible consequences per game round, which occur in a well-deﬁned
jittered interval, the Response to Outcome interval: (1) Show of Match
chip: the choice of a matching chip is exposed and the player is
rewarded by disposing of the selected chip plus one additional random
chip from the game board. At the end of these trials, players dispose of 2
chips (overt gain); (2) Show of Non-Match chip: the player's choice of
non-matching chip is exposed and they are punished by receiving
back the selected chip plus two additional chips (from the bank orpreviously played chips, thus not chosen by the player), for a total of 3
chips (i.e. overt loss); (3) No-Show of Non-Match chip: a choice of a
non-matching chip remains unexposed and only the selected chip is
disposed of, so the player is not penalized for a non-matching choice
(relative gain); and (4)No-ShowofMatch chip: the choice of amatching
chip is not exposed and only the selected matching chip is disposed of,
so the player is relatively punished as they could have disposed of an ad-
ditional chip (relative loss). Thus, in the game context, matching chips
are considered ‘safe’ moves and non-matching chips are considered
‘risky’moves or ‘bluffs’, since they are associated with gains and losses
of chips, respectively. It is only possible to win and to collect the
resulting monetary bonus by occasionally blufﬁng (i.e. playing a non-
matching chip). Importantly, the opponent's chip is constant through-
out the game to avoid the possibility of having a matching chip on the
board for all rounds of a game which allows the player a game without
choosing a non-matching chip. This design ensures the player cannot
evade blufﬁng during most (if not all) games (note that blufﬁng occurs
when the player decides to do so). As in our previous study (Assaf et al.,
2009), theplayer'smentalizing andmotivation are tested by contrasting
the two possible opponent's responses (‘Show’ vs. ‘No-Show’) and the
two possible outcomes (‘Gains’ vs. ‘Losses’), respectively.
Rounds continue until the player wins (by disposing of all of their
chips) or loses (when either 240 s have passed or they receive all the
chips from the bank and the board back, and there are no more chips
they can receive).
Participants played Domino games over 4 scan runs of 10 min each
for 12.2 games on average. Participantswere told that theywere playing
against the experimenter for two runs and against the computer, gener-
ating randommoves, for two. The order of the human and computer op-
ponent runs was counterbalanced across subjects. The experimenter
told the participantswho theywere playing against via headphones im-
mediately before each run began and alsomade competitive comments
regarding the game just played (such as “you really gotme this time…”)
after human-component runs only.
To ensure that players were engaged in the game and believed that
winning was possible, if they did not win during the ﬁrst run, the ﬁrst
game of the second run was not automated and the experimenter
“threw” the game, ensuring that the player won. Sixteen of the 28
players (10 ASDs and 6 TDs) played a non-automated game; these
gameswere excluded from the analysis. Games shorter than oneminute
were not analyzed as well.
Participants practiced the game outside the scanner prior to scan-
ning. Scanning began when the experimenter was convinced that
participants understood the game's rules. A thorough debrieﬁng was
carried out immediately after scanning, during which participants
were asked about their emotions and strategies while playing the Dom-
ino games using open-ended questions and a Likert scale questionnaire
where participants rated their responses on a scale of 1(least) to 5
(most) agreement to statements (see examples in Table 2).
2.3. Behavioral data analysis
Mixed-effects ANOVAs of Group (ASD vs. TD) by Opponent Type
(Human vs. Computer) were conducted to evaluate differences in
games played and won and numbers of games shorter than 1 min.
Similarly, Likert scale scores were analyzed using a mixed-effects
ANOVA using group as a between-subjects variable and opponent
type as a within-subjects variable. Follow-up one sample t-tests against
themiddle score of 3 were conducted within group to assess signiﬁcant
agreement or disagreement with the scale's statements.
To characterize players' choices during the game, a Risk Index was
deﬁned as the ratio between the number of times a player chose a
non-matching chip (only when a choice between non-matching and
matching chips was available) to the total number of chips played
(again, only when a choice between non-matching and matching
chips was available). This index represents an unbiased choice when
Fig. 1. Domino game paradigm. The upper panel describes the 4 intervals that comprise each round of the game: Decision Making, Ready, Anticipation to Outcome and Response to Out-
come. The latter is the main focus of this study, thus it is highlighted in gray. The duration of each interval and the command (i.e. event) that starts it are described in the bolded arrows
below. The lower panel depicts the Domino Game sequence and corresponding consequences. At the beginning of each game the player (participant scanned) receives 12 playing chips
and his/her goal is to dispose of themwithin 4 min. A constant opponent's chip (in this example 6:5, shown enlarged in the yellow ellipsoid) towhich the playermatches one chip in each
round of the game, is displayed in the upper left corner of the screen throughout the game. Each round starts with the player instructed to decide what chip he/she will play next by the
command ‘Choose’ (Decision-making interval). Then the player is instructed tomove the cursor to this chip (Ready interval). The chip can eithermatch the opponent's (i.e. have one of the
numbers match those on the opponent's chip, upper row, 5:1 in this example) or not (lower row:3:3). After placing the selected chip face down next to the opponent's, he/she awaits
the opponent's response (Anticipation of Outcome interval). The opponent can either challenge the player's choice (‘Show’) or not (‘No-Show’). Based on the player's choice and
the opponent's response there are four possible consequences for each round (Response to Outcome interval): Show Match (overt gain); No-Show Match (relative loss, as the player
could have been rewarded if challenged); Show Non-Match (overt loss) and No-Show Non-Match (relative gain, as the player could have been punished if challenged).
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biased choice for matching chips (i.e. playing safer) when b0.5, or for
non-matching chips (i.e. playing riskier) when N0.5. A mixed-effects
ANOVA, using group as a between-subjects variable and opponent
type and time (i.e. minutes1 to 4 of the game) as within-subjects
variables, was used to assess strategy differences in relation to group,
opponent type and game progress in time.
2.4. Functional MRI acquisition
Blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) data were collected
with a T2*-weighted echo planar imaging (EPI) sequence (TR/TE =
1860/27 ms, Flip angle = 70°, Field of view = 22 cm with a 64 × 64
acquisition matrix) using a Siemens Allegra 3 T scanner. Thirty-six
contiguous axial functional slices of 3 mm thickness with 1 mm gapTable 2
Participants' responses to post-scan debrieﬁng.
Question ASD
Human Com
Q1 I did everything I could to win the game 4.5 ± 1.3** 4.5
Q2 I only played the chips after choosing them ﬁrst 4.2 ± 1.3* 4.2
Q3 I took my opponent's last moves into account before deciding
which chip to play next (M)
3.9 ± 1.7 3.7
Q4 I felt glad when a matching chip was challenged (OG) 4.4 ± 1.3* 4.2
Q5 I felt glad when a non-matching chip was not challenged (RG) 3.7 ± 1.7 3.6
Q6 I felt upset when a non-matching chip was challenged (OL) 2.5 ± 1.6 2.7
Q7 I felt upset when a matching chip was not challenged (RL) 3.8 ± 1.4 3.7
* p b 0.05, ** p b 0.005 for one-sample t-test, testing difference from the middle score of 3. G =
Mentalizing question; OG = Overt Gains; RG = Relative Gains; OL = Overt Losses; RL = Relwere acquired, yielding 3.4 × 3.4 × 4.0 mmvoxels. Overall, 330 images
were acquired during each run, including 6 ‘dummy’ images at the
beginning to allow global image intensity to reach equilibrium, which
were excluded from data analysis.2.5. Functional data analysis
Imaging data were analyzed using SPM5 (Wellcome Department of
Cognitive Neurology, London, UK). Each individual's data set was
realigned to the ﬁrst ‘non-dummy’ image using the INRIAlign toolbox
(A. Roche, INRIA Sophia Antipolis, EPIDAURE Group), spatially normal-
ized to the Montreal Neurological Institute space (Friston et al., 1995)
and spatially smoothed with a 9 mm isotropic (FWHM) Gaussian
kernel.TD Group (GR) × Opponent Type (OT) ANOVA
puter Human Computer GR ME OT ME Interaction
± 1.3** 4.3 ± 1.0** 4.0 ± 1.0** n.s. n.s. n.s.
± 1.1* 3.8 ± 1.0* 4.2 ± 1.1** n.s. n.s. n.s.
± 1.6 4.2 ± 0.7** 3.8 ± 1.0* n.s. F = 5.7, p = 0.02 n.s.
± 1.4* 4.2 ± 0.9** 4.2 ± 0.9** n.s. n.s. n.s.
± 1.7 4.1 ± 1.2** 4.1 ± 1.2** n.s. n.s. n.s.
± 1.6 2.7 ± 1.6 2.9 ± 1.0 n.s. n.s. n.s.
± 1.4 3.3 ± 1.1 3.1 ± 1.0 n.s. n.s. n.s.
Group (ASD, TD); OT = Opponent Type (Human, Computer); ME = Main effect; M =
ative Losses.
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Hyatt et al., 2012; Kahnet al., 2002), we deﬁned four intervals of interest
to use for fMRI analyses (Fig. 1): The Decision-making interval was de-
ﬁned from the ‘Choose’ command onset to the ‘Ready’ onset, during
which players were instructed to decide on their next move without
being able to move on the board. The Ready interval was deﬁned from
the onset of ‘Ready’ to the onset of ‘Go’. These ﬁrst two intervals lasted
4 s each. The third interval, Anticipation of Outcome, started after the
selected chip was placed face down beside the opponent's chip and
endedwith the opponent's response. This interval was sorted according
to the player's choice of matching or non-matching chips. The fourth in-
terval, Response to Outcome, started after the opponent's response and
ended with the next ‘Choose’ onset. Trials were sorted according to the
player's choice and the opponent's response to derive the 4 conditions
described above (Show Match, Show Non-Match, No-Show Match and
No-Show Non-Match). The third and fourth intervals randomly lasted
3.4, 5.4 or 7.4 s each and were thus jittered (Dale and Buckner, 1997).
For every subject, a general linear model (GLM) was estimated with
SPM using the ‘Ready’, ‘Anticipation of Outcome’ and ‘Response to Out-
come’ intervals as regressors (separately for Human and Computer
runs) while the ‘Decision-making’ interval was not modeled to be
consistent with previous publications (Admon et al., 2013; Assaf et al.,
2009; Kahn et al., 2002). A high-pass ﬁlter with a cut-off of 128 s was
applied to correct for EPI signal low frequency drift. Next, individual
statistical parametric maps of the 4 Response to Outcome interval
conditions were calculated for each Opponent type. These maps were
entered into two separate whole-brain mixed-effects ANOVAs to delin-
eate the mentalizing and motivation (i.e. reward/gain) networks: (1) A
Group (ASD vs. TD) byOpponent Type (Human vs. Computer) by Oppo-
nent Response (Show vs. No-Show) ANOVA was calculated to assess
group differences in thementalizing network independently of motiva-
tion (gains vs. losses). As described in our previous work (Assaf et al.,
2009), we consider both ‘Show’ and ‘No-Show’ conditions to entail
mentalizing; however, the ‘Show’ events require more information
processing since the player uses new information about the opponent
to update his/her representation of the opponent's state of mind
(i.e. both strategy and potential next moves). This is due to the fact
that the opponent obtains new information about the player during
these events (e.g. if the player bluffed or played fairly). From the
perspective of the player, the opponent might use this information to
change his/her strategy. Thus, the player has to take more information
into account when updating his/her representation of the opponent,
requiring greater levels of mentalizing. We therefore expected regions
related to mentalizing to show differential activation along this param-
eter in the human-opponent runs and be more prominent in the
human- than the computer-opponent runs. Thus, the mentalizing
network was deﬁned as regions showing greater activation to Show
than No-Show conditions in the human-opponent runs as well as a
main effect of opponent type such that human was greater than
computer (see Assaf et al., 2009) across all participants; (2) A group
(ASD vs. TD) by Opponent Type (Human vs. Computer) by Outcome
(Gains vs. Losses) mixed-effects ANOVA was calculated to assess group
differences in brain activity of motivation processes related to gains
(i.e. response to reward) independently of mentalizing (i.e. opponent's
response). The reward-motivation networkwas deﬁned as themain effect
of Outcome (Gains N Losses) across all subjects. Since we did not expect
differences between human- and computer-opponents in responses to
gains, the effect of Opponent Type was not integrated into the deﬁnition
of the motivation network (i.e. main effect of Opponent Type) as for the
mentalizing network. For both networks, a mask was created based on
the group analyses described above (qFDR b 0.05, k = 50), to create
regions of interest (ROIs) for follow-up analyses.
To assess group differences within the mentalizing network, we
calculated the following contrasts (which are effectively interactions
between Group and Opponent Response within the Human-opponent
runs): TD (Human Show − Human No-Show) +/− ASD (HumanShow − Human No-Show). Group differences within themotivation
network were assessed with the contrasts (i.e. interactions): TD
(Human Gains − Human Losses) +/− ASD (Human Gains − Human
Losses). Note, that for these between-group difference analyses, we
used nonparametric permutation-based cluster-level statistical infer-
ence. We entered ﬁrst-level analysis contrasts generated in SPM5 into
a second-level analysis using the FSL Randomise v2.1 tool (Oxford Uni-
versity, Oxford UK; http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl/randomise). Since
our sample had a wide range of age and IQ scores, we controlled for
those parameters in all group analyses (themissing IQ scores of one pa-
tient and one controlwere replacedwith the corresponding group aver-
age score). Randomise implements a permutation method in which
subjects in the design matrix are repeatedly reordered (10,000 itera-
tions) to form the null probability distribution for the maximal cluster
mass. Cluster mass is deﬁned as the integral of voxel intensities above
the cluster-deﬁning threshold within each cluster, and has been
shown to be superior to the use of simple cluster extent (Bullmore
et al., 1999; Hayasaka and Nichols, 2004). The cluster-deﬁning thresh-
old for the cluster-level statistics was set at P = 0.05 (uncorrected),
and as mentioned above, voxels included in the analysis were mask re-
stricted to thosewithin a given network (e.g., the overall brain network
for either thementalizing or motivation processes). Cluster mass statis-
tics were reported at Pcluster b 0.05 family-wise error (FWE) rate
corrected (i.e., the probability of that cluster mass occurring by chance,
within a given brain network, was less than 5%).
In addition, to evaluate the correlations between brain activation
related to motivation/mentalizing and the symptom severity of the
individuals with ASDs, partial correlation analyses were conducted
between the ADOS and SRS scores and the contrasts: Human
Show N No-Show and Human Gains N Losses controlling for age
and IQ (note that the motivation and mentalizing masks were ap-
plied for these analyses as well). Cluster mass threshold was set as
described above at Pcluster b 0.05, FWE corrected.
To assess the speciﬁcity of group differences in activation related
to human- vs. computer-opponent to the mentalizing and motiva-
tion networks, we calculated a 2 × 2 mixed-effects ANOVA of
Group × Opponent Type in the Ready interval. This interval includes
buttons presses (moving the cursor between the playing chips) and
visual input of the game board; thus this analysis explores potential
group differences and interaction with opponent type in the motor
and visual cortices.
To further evaluate the magnitude of the results, contrast values
from individual subjects were extracted for each condition at the points
of maximum group results and these values were entered into an
ANOVA analysis using SPSS™ (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL). Note that no
new analyses were performed in SPSS.
3. Results
3.1. Behavioral data
Mixed-effects ANOVAs showed no group differences or group by
opponent type interaction in number of games longer than 1 min
played and their length, games won or games shorter than 1 min.
Analyses of the Likert scale responses showed that both groupswere
engaged in the game andwanted towin (Table 2, Q1) and selected their
chips intentionally (i.e. not randomly; Table 2, Q2). Mixed-effects
ANOVAs of Group by Opponent Type found differences in neither
group nor opponent type (Table 2).
In responses to mentalizing statements (e.g. Table 2, Q3), one-
sample t-tests showed that TD but not individuals with ASDs took
their human-opponent's moves into account when playing and did so
more in the human- compared to computer-opponent runs (Human
vs. Computer in TD: t(13) = 2.1, p = 0.05). As expected, the repeated
measures ANOVA showed a signiﬁcant main effect of Opponent Type
(F(1,21) = 5.7, p = 0.02), such that participants took their human-
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moves. However, there was no signiﬁcant main effect of group or a
group by Opponent Type interaction (F = 0.2, p N 0.01 and F = 0.3,
p N 0.1, respectively.
To evaluate the motivational aspect of the game (related to gains
and losses), we assessed the players' appraisal (“I was glad when…”
or “I was upset when…”) of the various outcomes: overt gains
(Table 2, Q4), relative gains (Q5), overt losses (Q6) and relative losses
(Q7). As in our previous study (Assaf et al., 2009), TDs' responses to
gains (either overt or relative)were signiﬁcantwhile responses to losses
(overt and relative) were not. The responses of individuals with ASDs
were signiﬁcant to overt gains only. Mixed-effects ANOVAs showed no
signiﬁcant Group or Opponent Type differences or interactions.
Finally, players' strategy over time as measured by the Risk Taking
Index (RTI) was assessed. The average RTI for individuals with ASDs and
TD for human- and computer-opponent games were: ASD: 0.39 ± 0.15
and 0.43 ± 0.15, TD: 0.39 ± 0.16 and 0.38 ± 0.16, respectively (no sig-
niﬁcant Group or Opponent Type effects). A mixed-effects ANOVA of
Group by Opponent Type by Time demonstrated a signiﬁcant main effect
of Time (F(1,3) = 6.3, p = 0.002) such that players chose to ‘bluff’ their
opponent more towards the middle of a game (minutes 2–3) than at the
beginning and end (minutes 1 and 4; see Fig. 2). No signiﬁcant interac-
tions were found. This is in accord with previous results in healthy indi-
viduals (Assaf et al., 2009).3.2. Functional brain data
3.2.1. Mentalizing network
As described above and previously (Assaf et al., 2009), to examine
the brain areas involved inmentalizing processes regardless of outcome
(i.e. motivation) we used the Group by Opponent Type by Opponent
Response mixed-effects ANOVA and determined which regions were
activated more during Human Show than No-Show events and also
more during all human-opponent than computer-opponent events
(i.e. main effect of Opponent Type), across all subjects (qFDR b 0.05,
k = 50), while controlling for age and IQ. The resulting network is
depicted in Fig. 3A and Table 3 and is composed of bilateral temporal
poles (TP), temporoparietal junctions (TPJ), including superior tempo-
ral sulcus,middle and inferior temporal gyri (STS, MTG and ITG),medial
prefrontal cortex (MPFC), posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) and puta-
men, plus right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) and fusiform
gyrus (FG).Fig. 2. Players' choices as a function of time. Risk-Taking Index (number of non-match
choices divided by the total number of non-match andmatch choiceswhen both are avail-
able to the player) for games played against human- (solid lines) and computer- (dashed
lines) opponent are plotted for eachminute of the game (averaged for all games) for indi-
viduals with ASDs (black lines) and healthy controls (gray lines). There was a signiﬁcant
main effect for time (F(1,3) = 6.3, p = 0.002) but not for opponent type or group.3.2.2. Group differences within the mentalizing network
Interaction analyses revealed group differences in bilateral MTG
(Fig. 3B, Table 3), such that TD showed greater activation to the contrast
Human Show N No-Show than individuals with ASDs (left and right
MTG: t = 3.88 and 2.9, respectively; Pcluster b 0.05, FWE correction),
while controlling for age and IQ. Follow-up within subject group
ANOVAs demonstrated signiﬁcantlymore activation inHuman vs. Com-
puter opponent in left MTG in both groups (ASD: t = 1.91, p = 0.04;
TD: t = 3.53, p = 0.002) and in right MTG in TD group only (t =
3.17, p = 0.004). Within group paired t-tests demonstrated that indi-
viduals with ASDs showed diminished response to the Human Show
condition (Fig. 3C andD), such that therewere no signiﬁcant differences
between the Show and No-Show events in the Human runs in
this group (right and left MTG: t = 4.04, p = 0.0009 and t = 4.29,
p = 0.0006, respectively). Thus, while controls showed differentiation
between Show and No-Show events in the Human Opponent runs as
expected (this difference in the Computer Opponent runs showed sig-
niﬁcance on the rightMTG: t = 2.62, p = 0.01 and only a trend toward
signiﬁcance on the left (t = 2.04, p = 0.06)), ASD subjects showed no
differentiation between the Human Show and No-Show conditions
with a much weaker main effect of Opponent Type (due to a differenti-
ation between the Computer Show and No-Show events; see Fig. 3C
and D).
3.2.3. Correlation of mentalizing neural activity with patient symptom
severity
For the ASD group, we computed partial correlation analyses
between the contrast Human Show N No-Show (i.e. Mentalizing) and
ADOS and SRS scores within the Mentalizing network (Fig. 3A), while
controlling for age and IQ. No cluster survived correction for multiple-
comparisons. With more liberal thresholding (p b 0.001, uncorrected,
k = 5), one cluster in theMPFC showed signiﬁcant negative correlation
with ADOS Communication subscale (x = −9, y = 45, z = 9;
r = −0.85, p = 0.001; see Supplementary Fig. 1). The correlation pat-
tern suggested thatworse symptom severity was associatedwith lesser
activation related to mentalizing processes.
3.2.4. Motivation network
To assess activation related tomotivation we used the Group by Op-
ponent Type byOutcomemixed-effects ANOVA and examined themain
effect of Outcome (gains vs. losses) across Opponent Type and Group
(qFDR b 0.05, k = 50), while controlling for age and IQ. This network in-
cluded bilateral NAcc, middle frontal gyri (MFG) and superior parietal
lobules (SPL), as depicted in Fig. 4A.
3.2.5. Group differences within the motivation network
Interaction analyses demonstrated group differences in right NAcc
only (t = 3.07, Pcluster b 0.05, FWE correction; Fig. 4B and Table 3), con-
trolling for age and IQ. While TD showed reward-related activation
(gains N losses) in this region overall (t = 4.86, p = 0.0002) and sepa-
rately for both Human and Computer runs (t = 4.37, p = 0.0005 and
t = 3.94, p = 0.001, respectively), individuals with ASDs showed a
trend for this effect in Computer runs only (t = 1.62; p = 0.06);
Fig. 4C).
3.2.6. Correlation of motivation neural activity with patient symptom
severity
Partial correlation analyses between the contrast Human
Gains N Losses and ADOS and SRS scores within the motivation net-
work (Fig. 4A) showed no signiﬁcant results, even at a low uncorrected
threshold (p b 0.01).
3.2.7. Motor and visual cortices
Amixed-effects ANOVA of Group by Opponent Type of the Ready in-
terval events showed a main effect of condition in the leftpre-central
gyrus (x = −45, y = −30, z = 57; PFWE b 0.05) and primary visual
Table 3
Brain regions activated during the Response to Outcome interval.
Anatomic location of maximum activation MNI coordinates T score
x y z
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z = 0; PFWE b 0.05). There was no signiﬁcant main effect of Group or
interaction of Group and Opponent Type in these cortices (see Supple-
mentary Fig. 2).Mentalizing Network
Human Show N No-Show masked with Human N Computer (all subjects)
L TPJ (ITS/MTG/STS) −54 −60 9 6.66
R TPJ (ITS/MTG/STS) 57 −48 12 6.40
L TP −39 18 −30 3.40
R TP 36 18 −39 3.52
R FG 45 −45 −18 5.26
MPFC 0 42 12 3.75
PCC 9 −45 39 3.99
R VLPFC 51 15 36 5.74
L Putamen −21 9 −15 4.00
R Putamen 15 12 −6 3.18
Healthy Controls N ASD individuals
L MTG −60 −45 −3 2.54
R MTG 57 −30 −12 3.20
Reward-related Motivation Network
Gains N Losses (all subjects)
L NAcc −12 15 −3 4.19
R NAcc 18 12 −9 5.10
L MFG (BA 6) −30 −6 57 4.55
R MFG (BA 6) 33 3 57 5.33
L SPL −39 −48 57 5.18
R SPL 42 −30 42 5.10
Healthy Controls N ASD individuals
R NAcc 15 15 −9 3.07
BA, Brodmann region; FG, fusiform gyrus; ITS, inferior temporal sulcus;MFG, middle fron-
tal gyrus; MPFC, medial prefrontal cortex; MTG, middle temporal gyrus; NAcc, nucleus
accumbens; OFC, orbitofrontal cortex; PCC, posterior cingulate cortex; SPL, superior parie-
tal lobule; STS, superior temporal sulcus; TP, temporal pole; TPJ, temporoparietal junction;
VLPFC, ventrolateral prefrontal cortex; L, left; R, right.4. Discussion
Weused an apriorideﬁned interval during a competitive, two-player
fMRI game, to delineate the neural function of brain areas selectively
involved in implicit ‘on-line’mentalizing and in reward-relatedmotiva-
tion processes in high-functioning individuals with ASDs compared
to healthy controls. Results demonstrated deﬁcits in the MTG for
mentalizing, and in the NAcc for motivation, but not inmotor and visual
areas in the ASD group. These functional deﬁcits were observed only
when the individuals with ASDs were involved in a social interaction,
representing failure of theMTGandNAcc to increase activity in these in-
dividuals in a social context compared to a perceptually identical non-
social situation. Thus, when playing in a non-social context (i.e. against
a computer-opponent), individuals with ASDs showed a pattern of
brain activations similar to controls, but they failed to show the antici-
pated increase in activation in a social context (i.e. when playing against
what they believed was a human-opponent) in the MTG and NAcc. No-
tably, individuals with ASDs showed comparable understanding of and
performance on the Domino task— they played and won similar num-
bers of games, showed similar risk taking behavior over time, were as
eager to play the game and chose chips to play intentionally as controls.Fig. 3.Mentalizing network. Panel A depicts the activationmap of a mixed-effects ANOVA
showing brain regions with a signiﬁcant effect of Opponent's Response in the Human-
Opponent runs (Show N No-Show) and Opponent Type in all participants (n = 27,
qFDR b 0.05). These regions included the temporoparietal junction (TPJ), temporal pole
(TP), medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), ventrolateral pre-
frontal cortex (VLPFC), fusiform gyrus (FG) and putamen. Panel B shows themap of brain
areas exhibiting an interaction between Human Show vs. No-Show events and Group,
masked with the mentalizing network as presented in panel A. Bilateral MTGexhibited a
signiﬁcant effect such that controls showed a greater response to Show vs. No-Show com-
pared to individuals with ASDs (left MTG Pcluster = 0.03 FWE, right MTG Pcluster = 0.04
FWE; for presentation purposes, clusters are shown at a threshold of P b 0.05 uncorrected,
k = 20). Percent signal change of the different events in these regions are shown inPanels
C & D. **p b 0.001; *p b 0.05; ^p = 0.06; L = left; R = right hemisphere.
Fig. 4.Reward-relatedMotivation network. Panel (A) shows the activationmap of amixed-
effects ANOVA showing brain regionswith a signiﬁcantmain effect of Outcome during both
human- and computer-opponent runs in all participants (n = 27, qFDR b 0.05). This
network includes bilateral NAcc, MFG and SPL. Panel (B) depicts brain regions showing a
signiﬁcant interaction between Outcome and Groupmaskedwith regions showing a signif-
icantmain effect of Outcome as shown in panel A. The right NAccwas the only region show-
ing a signiﬁcant interaction (Pcluster = 0.05 FWE; for presentation purposes cluster is
shown at a threshold of P b 0.05 uncorrected, k = 20), such that TD individuals showed
signiﬁcantly more activations for Gains than Losses for both opponents in this region,
while individuals with ASDs showed such an effect during the Computer-Opponent
games only (panel C). **p b 0.001; *p b 0.05; ^p = 0.06; L = left; R = right hemisphere.
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post-scan debrieﬁng tomentalizing andmotivation statements; howev-
er, for the mentalizing statements (e.g. Table 2, Q3) participants with
ASDs did not report taking their human- and computer-opponent's
moves into accountwhen playing, as did the controls. Belowwe discuss
our results pertaining to the activation of the mentalizing and motiva-
tion networks in individuals with ASDs and controls.4.1. The mentalizing network
We showed previously that while playing the Domino games,
healthy individuals engage in mentalizing processes and activate a neu-
ral network known to be involved in mentalizing (Assaf et al., 2009).
Consistent with these previous results, TD individuals in the current
study indicated they were taking into account their opponent's re-
sponses before deciding on their next move, signiﬁcantly more so for
human- than computer-opponent games. Conversely, although group
differences were not signiﬁcant, the responses of individuals with
ASDs on the Likert scale to mentalizing statements (e.g. Q3 in Table 2)
were not signiﬁcantly different from the neutral score of 3 for either of
the opponents and there was no difference between the opponent
types, indicating that theywere not consciously thinking about their op-
ponent, and thus they might not have fully engaged the mentalizing
network while playing.
The implicit ‘on-line’mentalizing-related areas were deﬁned as areas
showing the combined effect of Opponent's Response/Mentalizing in
Human-Opponent (‘Show’ vs. ‘No-Show’) and Opponent Type (Human
vs. Computer) regardless of the Motivation effect, in all participants.
This network included the TPJ (STS, MTG and ITS), TP, MPFC, PCC, FG,
VLPFC and putamen. Except for the 2 latter areas, these areas were
demonstrated in our previous work (Assaf et al., 2009) and others' ex-
plicit ‘off-line’ and implicit ‘on-line’ mentalizing neuroimaging studies
(e.g. Assaf et al., 2009; Castelli et al., 2000; Frith and Frith, 2003;
Gallagher et al., 2000, 2002; McCabe et al., 2001; Rilling et al., 2004;
Vanderwal et al., 2008; Vogeley et al., 2001). Contrary to the current re-
sults, we previously showed that VLPFC activation was sensitive to
mentalizing, but not to opponent type, and concluded that its activation
is related to general top-down regulation that is not speciﬁc to social
processes (Assaf et al., 2009). However, the current results as well as
other reports support a more speciﬁc involvement in social-cognitive
processes, such as trustworthiness (Pinkham et al., 2008) and
mentalizing (e.g. Kobayashi et al., 2007). To the best of our knowledge,
the putamen has not previously been implicated in mentalizing. It is
possible that its activation in our study is related to the general reward
associated with social interaction (Krach et al., 2010). More work
should be done to conﬁrm this result.
As mentioned above, individuals with ASDs showed abnormal
mentalizing activation in bilateral MTG. In both areas, group differences
were the result of diminished response to the Show events, which we
suggest entails a highermentalizing load than theNo-Show events, dur-
ing the Human-Opponent runs only in the ASD group. Thus, individuals
with ASDs show no differentiation between the Show and No-Show
conditions when playing against a human opponent. BOLD responses
during the Computer-Opponent runs in this group were similar to
those of controls. In addition, albeit at a more relaxed statistical thresh-
old, the activation of the MPFC correlated with the symptom severity of
individuals with ASDs as measured by the ADOS Communication
subscale score, such that individuals with more severe deﬁcits showed
less mentalizing-related activation in this region (note that medication
at time of scan did not seem to drive the results; see Supplementary
Fig. 1).
We point out that although TPJ is more traditionally considered a
core mentalizing region than MTG/STS and thus group differences
might be expected there, a recent review showed that these regions
are almost equally activated by mentalizing tasks in general, and STS/
MTG is activated more often in tasks associated with intentions
(Carrington and Bailey, 2009). In addition, other mentalizing studies
implicate this region in ASDs. As mentioned in the introduction, only a
handful of neuroimaging studies have explored the mentalizing net-
work in individuals with ASDs, most using explicit ‘off-line’mentalizing
tasks, with conﬂicting results. Using reading comprehension tasks of
theory of mind (ToM) stories, where participants are instructed to
infer the intentions of other people, Happe et al. (1996) showed
hypoactivation of left PFC in BA 8/9 and increased activation in an
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Mason et al. (2008) showed hyperactivation of the right temporo-
parietal junction, including MTG clusters overlapping our cluster show-
ing mentalizing group differences, in 18 high-functioning individuals
with ASDs during different types of inferences, including emotional
and intentional ToM processes (see Supplementary Fig. 3). Using tasks
that require inferring the emotions of others by expressions of the face
or eyes only, Piggot et al. (2004) showed hypoactivation of the fusiform
gyrus in 14 adolescents with high-functioning ASD, while Baron-Cohen
et al. (1999) showed hypoactivation of the amygdala but not STS
and PFC in six adults with autism. Castelli et al. (2002) used the Social
Attribution fMRI task, where participants were asked to describe
short animations of shapes moving in either random, goal-directed or
intentionally-directed fashions (the latter involvedmentalizing). Impor-
tantly, this task is closest to ours conceptually, as it also employs ‘on-line’
mentalizing (albeit not implicitly). They showed hypoactivation in indi-
viduals with ASDs in several areas of the mentalizing network, including
temporo-parietal junction and superior temporal sulcus, areas adjacent
to the left MTG cluster showing hypoactivation in the ASD group in our
study (Supplementary Fig. 3). Our results show speciﬁc deﬁcits in the
MTG during mentalizing while individuals with ASDs are competing
with what they believe is another person, thinking about his/her goals
and intentions, and updating their behavior accordingly (implicit ‘on-
line’ mentalizing). These results further support the ‘mind-blindness’
theory (e.g. Baron-Cohen, 1995), which suggests that deﬁcits in the
mentalizing network are the basis of ASD psychopathology, pointing to
the MTG and MPFC as the areas affected.
4.2. The motivation network
As in previous results, behavioral data showed that the Domino
game is sensitive to the valence of gains (i.e. reward), either overt or rel-
ative, but not to losses (i.e. punishment) in healthy individuals. Thiswas
true in the ASD group for overt gains only, although no signiﬁcant
between-group differences were found. The reward-related motivation
network was deﬁned as areas showing more activation to gains than
losses in both human- and computer-opponent runs in all participants,
independently of thementalizing effect. This network included bilateral
NAcc, MFG and SPL (post-central gyrus). These results are in agreement
with our previous study in healthy individuals (Assaf et al., 2009) and
with other research on the reward network (for review see Haber and
Knutson, 2010).
Group differences in the Motivation network were detected only
in the right NAcc. As for the Mentalizing network, these differences
resulted from failure of NAcc activation to increase in response to
gains during the Human-Opponent runs, leading to lack of differentia-
tion between the Gains and Losses events in these runs in individuals
with ASDs. Activations related to Gains and Losses during the
Computer-Opponent runs were similar to those of controls (albeit
statistically not as strong).
To our knowledge, only ﬁve other studies to date have explored the
reward network activation in individuals with ASDs; four showed
decreased patient activation in NAcc. Dichter et al. (2012b) used amon-
etary and patient-salient objects modiﬁed incentive delay fMRI task to
assess the neural correlates of adults with high-functioning ASD com-
pared to TD during anticipation and response to the two reward types.
They demonstrated an interaction between group and reward type dur-
ing reward anticipation in bilateral NAcc, such that participants with
ASD shad hypoactivation to monetary but not to object rewards. In a
more recent study from this group (Dichter et al., 2012a), using a similar
fMRI task but replacing the ASD-salient object with face images to rep-
resent social rewards, individualswith ASDs also showed hypoactivation
of the right NAcc duringmonetary – but not social – reward anticipation.
Kohls et al. (2013) also showed hypoactivation of the NAcc in ASDs,
again during monetary but not social reward processing, using similar
task. Importantly, the latter authors questioned the use of static faceimages as social reward stimuli. Conversely, Scott-Van Zeeland et al.
(2010) used an fMRI reward learning task with either social (i.e. happy
or sad faces) ormonetary rewardswith high-functioning ASD adolescent
boys. They demonstrated hypoactivation of fronto-striatal regions, in-
cluding the NAcc, in response to social rewards and social, but not mon-
etary, reward learning.
Our results further suggest a deﬁcit in NAcc activation during
response to rewards. This deﬁcit is speciﬁc to a social context of a com-
petitive interaction with a perceived human vs. identical non-social in-
teraction with a computer, emphasizing the deﬁcits in processing
rewards in a social context vs. social rewards per se (e.g. faces), as this
hypothesis has been interpreted and tested in the previous neuroimag-
ing studies (e.g. Dichter et al., 2012a; Scott-Van Zeeland et al., 2010).
Importantly, our results are in accord with the social motivation
hypothesis (Chevallier et al., 2012; Dawson et al., 1998, 2005; Schultz,
2005); however, given our similar results related to mentalizing pro-
cesses and their neural correlates, and the lack of similar effects in
motor and visual cortices, this social deﬁcit does not seem to be speciﬁc
tomotivation processes and can be seen in other, related social-cognitive
processes during inter-personal interaction. Our study is not designed to
provide evidence for causality between social motivation and cognition
processes (i.e. mentalizing) as hypothesized by others (e.g. Chevallier
et al., 2012). Taken together, these results can explain the neural
basis of the observed decreased response of individuals with ASDs to
human/social reinforcement (Freitag, 1970; Garretson et al., 1990;
Geurts et al., 2008) and have implications for treatment development.
They also emphasize the critical importance of testing and treating indi-
viduals with ASDs in a social context (i.e. while being involved with
other people) to reliably assess their abilities and treatment efﬁcacy in
‘real-life’ situations.
4.3. The executive dysfunction and weak central coherence theories of
autism
The mentalizing and motivation theories are only two of several
existing models that attempt to explain the symptoms of ASDs. Two
other leading theories are the executive dysfunction (EF) and weak
central coherence (WCC) hypotheses (for review see Rajendran and
Mitchell, 2007). Both theories suggest a more general-domain deﬁcit.
The EF theory suggests that impairments in executive functions under-
lie the deﬁciencies seen in ASDs, while theWCC theory suggests that in-
dividualswith ASDs fail to process information in a global, coherentway
but rather they are focused on details. We note that executive functions
and central (or global) coherence processing are most likely utilized
when playing Domino to maintain information on the game's rules
and progress and to decide on their own moves, and might be required
for mentalizing andmotivation processes. However, because our design
does not manipulate players' behavior on the EF and central coherence
processing domains, we cannot refer to related behavioral or neurolog-
ical impairments in ASDs. Having said that, the fact that individualswith
ASD played similarly to controls might imply intact EF processing.
Future research should explore this in more depth.
4.4. Study limitations
Wenote several limitations of our study. First,we report results from
only 13 individuals with the diagnosis of ASDs; and although our major
ﬁndings were statistically reliable, replication of our results in a larger
sample would be helpful. Second, most of these individuals (8/13)
were medicated at the time of scan, and thus we cannot conclude
with conﬁdence that results are not confounded by medication effects
(although, as can be seen in Supplementary Fig. 1, neither of the 2
ASD groups (medicated vs. non-medicated) is driving the correlation
of symptom severity and MPFC activation; we lack the power to re-
peat analyses with medicated/unmediated individuals only). Third,
as mentioned above, it is possible that diminished neural response
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can also be evident in negative-valence (i.e. punishment) motivational
events. However, since the Domino task does not reliably activate
brain areas involved in response to punishment (probably due to low
valence of punishment events in the context of this game, Assaf et al.,
2009), punishment-related neural networks could not be assessed in
this study. Future studies should investigate this network in individuals
with ASDs, preferably in relation to reward processing. Finally, this
manuscript is focused on the Response to Outcome interval, which
includes response but not anticipation to rewards. Importantly, the
anticipation interval in the Domino task includes the potential of
experiencing gains or losses (overt or relative), thus contrary to other
reward tasks such as the monetary incentive delay task (e.g. Knutson
et al., 2000; Kohls et al., 2013), brain activity related to reward anticipa-
tion is difﬁcult to distinguish from punishment anticipation. Follow-up
studies should be designed a priori to explore brain activity related to
reward anticipation during a social interactive task.
5. Conclusions
Using an fMRI competitive game, the Domino paradigm, we showed
that individuals with high-functioning ASDs failed to show the typical
increased activation in MTG during mentalizing processing and in the
NAcc during reward processing, in a social context (i.e. when apparently
playing against another human), compared to a perceptually identical
non-social situation (i.e. when playing against a computer) where
they show typical activations. These activation deﬁcits were speciﬁc to
brain areas involved in social processes and were not demonstrated in
motor and visual cortices, thus they are in accord with both the mind-
blindness and the social motivation theories of ASDs, emphasizing the
importance of the social (vs. non-social) context of the experimental de-
sign (vs. the speciﬁc social-cognitive process) when exploring social-
motivation and mentalizing. Individuals with ASDs are known to have
reduced motivation in social contexts, with potential implication for
treatment methods/response (Freitag, 1970; Garretson et al., 1990;
Geurts et al., 2008); our study is the ﬁrst to demonstrate the neural
correlates of this phenomenon with a natural, interactive task.
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.nicl.2013.09.005.
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